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Abstract 
The LHC Beam Dumping System is one of the vital 
elements of the LHC Machine Protection System and has 
to operate reliably every time a beam dump request is 
made. Detailed dependability calculations have been 
made, resulting in expected rates for the different system 
failure modes. A 'reliability run' of the whole system, 
installed in its final configuration in the LHC, has been 
made to discover infant mortality problems and to 
compare the occurrence of the measured failure modes 
with their calculations. 
INTRODUCTION 
The LHC Beam Dumping System [1] must be able to 
safely abort the high intensity LHC beams at any given 
moment. The nominal system consists per LHC beam of 
15 horizontally deflecting kickers (MKD), 15 vertically 
deflecting septum magnets (MSD) and 10 dilution kicker 
magnets (MKB). Beam abort must take place upon 
request within a delay of less than 3 turns (about 300 μs) 
and be adjusted to the beam energy which varies between 
450 GeV at injection and 7 TeV at top energy.  
The energy stored in one nominal LHC beam is 
360 MJ, about 200 times larger than at HERA or the 
Tevatron. The energy stored in the superconducting 
magnets is 10 GJ. These amounts of energy, with their 
large damage potential, result in stringent requirements 
for the performance of the Machine Protection System [2, 
3].  
The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) is at the 
heart of the Machine Protection System. The design of the 
system was underlying stringent safety requirements and 
an in-depth dependability analysis of the system has been 
made [4, 5]. According to these studies the resulting 
unsafety of one beam dumping system is 2 ⋅ 10-7 per year, 
which corresponds largely to SIL4 (Safety and Integrity 
Level), and four safe ‘false dumps’ per year are expected 
per beam dumping system. 
RELIAIBILITY RUN 
Reason for Testing 
The aim of the reliability run of the LBDS is to: 
• Validate the reliability figures presented in [4, 5]; 
• Troubleshoot ‘infant mortality problems’; 
• Check for unexpected failure modes; 
• Obtain operational experience with the beam 
dumping system and the systems it interfaces to. 
The first item can be quantified for the solid state 
power switches of the MKD generators. In the reliability 
analysis of the LBDS a failure rate of the switches of 
λ = 2.4⋅10-6 per hour is used, according to the estimate of 
the manufacturer. The test hypothesis for the reliability 
run is more pessimistic with a switch failure rate of 
λ ≤ 10-4/h, allowing for a realistic test period. This 
corresponds to a safety level of SIL3 for a complete beam 
dumping system, which is still acceptable considering the 
complete LHC Machine Protection System. With this 
assumed failure rate, a running period of 3 months of both 
Beam Dumping Systems, with 75 % effective running 
time and pulsing on average one time every hour, would 
result in 6 switch failures, with a 95 % one-sided 
confidence level, see Fig. 1. It should be noted that a 
single switch failure, as looked for in the reliability run, is 
acceptable due to the large redundancy in the system. 
 
Figure 1: Lines corresponding to the testing period in 
months relating the different MKD switch failure rates λ 
to the expected number of failures [5]. 
Execution of the Tests 
The pulsed power systems MKD and MKB have been 
carefully tested and calibrated in the laboratory [6]. After 
installation in the LHC tunnel the systems have been 
commissioned in their final configuration. For the first 
year of LHC operation, only 4 MKB magnets are installed 
per beam, and the reliability run was performed with this 
reduced configuration. In November 2007 the Beam 1 
dumping system was operational in local mode and the 
first automated tests started. Gradually the system was 
connected up to the external systems: the Beam Interlock 
System (BIS), a Beam Energy Simulator, the Timing 
System and the RF-system. The Beam 2 System became 
operational in December 2007 and most of the data for 
this system have been collected in local mode. 
During the reliability run the diagnostics to 
automatically detect any system errors was operational: 
• Hardware systems to check the redundancy of the 
signal paths and that the measured voltages and 
currents are within the predefined tolerances. 
• An Internal Operational Check (IPOC) which 
analysis the required MKD and MKB waveforms, 
calculates typical points and compares these with the 
references. The IPOC is executed by the kicker 
system hardware. 
• An External Operation Check (XPOC) of the MKD 
and MKB waveforms, which executes a similar 
check as the IPOC, but executed on a central server, 
which also includes other LBDS analysis related to 
Beam Instrumentation measurements [7]. 
• Logging of all important parameters, for a large 
fraction provided by the IPOC and XPOC analysis. 
Statistics of the Executed Tests 
Data from the logging system has been collected, 
summarising the effective operational time of the two 
beam dumping systems and the different energies the 
system has been operated at. The reliability run is still 
ongoing at the moment of writing; only data up to the end 
of May 2008 are presented here. 
Data collection for the Beam 1 system started on 
8 November 2007. Until end of May 2008, the system has 
been pulsing 19648 times with an effective running time, 
defined as the time between pulses being less than 13 
hours, of 1593 hours. It is assumed that the system will 
have been operational for about 75 % of these 1593 hours, 
according to the reliability run requirements. The different 
energies at which the system has been pulsing are shown 
as a function of time in Fig. 2. The distribution for the 
different energies is shown in Fig. 3. Although the 
number of pulses at 7 TeV is limited (6 %), most of the 
‘waiting time’ under high voltage took place with 7 TeV 
settings (31 %). Table 1 summarises the operational data 
for the Beam 1 and the Beam 2 system. 
 
Figure 2: The different energies at which the Beam 1 
system has been pulsing as a function of the running time. 
Table 1: Summary of the running time for both beams. 
 Beam 1 Beam 2 
Number of pulses 19648 1332 
Period considered 6.8 months 5.6 months 
Effective running time 2.2 months 1.3 months 
Pulses at 7 TeV 6 % 5 % 
Time at 7 TeV 31 % 14 % 
 
Figure 3: The number of pulses as a function of energy for 
the Beam 1 system.
RESULTS OF THE TESTS 
Overall Results 
The most important overall result is that for the MKD 
extraction kicker system no critical failures occurred 
which would have resulted in a non-acceptable beam 
dump. No ‘asynchronous’ beam dumps were recorded. 
However, an unexpected common mode failure on the 
dilution kickers MKB was identified. 
MKD Switch Failures 
During the reliability run up to the end of May the 
equivalent running time for the two beams was 1.8 
months. According to Fig. 1 for this period 3 switch faults 
are expected, for the assumed failure rate of the reliability 
run of λ = 10-4/h. During the testing period four switches 
needed to be replaced due to a short circuit of one of the 
GTO discs; three on the Beam 1 system and one on the 
Beam 2 system. All failures were safe with the 
surveillance system triggering the beam dump after an 
error was detected. 
Other Failures 
The system has been constantly monitored with the 
IPOC and XPOC systems and the typical points have 
been recorded [6]. A falling trend in the pulse length, 
identified for two MKD systems, was traced back to a 
decreasing value of the capacitor used in the 
compensation circuit. These capacitors of the self-healing 
type are expected to reduce in value during their ‘burn-in 
period’, but should then stabilise, which was not the case 
for these two systems. These capacitors have been 
replaced. 
A fuse in the trigger circuit of the MKD systems broke 
down on five occasions. This was explained by an ‘under 
design’ of a part of the circuit, which will be adapted 
before operation with beam. During the testing period two 
power converter failures occurred, one for the main 
circuit and one for the compensation circuit. This is an 
average failure rate of 2⋅10-5/h, which is worse than the 
assumed 1⋅10-6/h. It is shown in [5, p.138] that this only 













Figure 4: Demonstration of the dependency of the MKD 
kick current [kA] at injection energy (bottom figure for 15 
generators) on the generator temperature (middle) which 
depends again on the generator energy setting (top). 
Temperature Effect of MKD Switches 
It was found that the kick amplitude of the MKD 
system was reduced by up to 1.4 % at low energies, after 
it had been operating for longer periods at higher 
energies. This was traced down to an unexpected 
temperature sensitivity of the solid state switch, either due 
running at higher energies or due to environmental 
temperature changes, see Fig. 4. A temperature regulation 
of the generator switch compartment is presently under 
development and will be installed for operation in 2009. 
This is also expected to be beneficial for the GTO 
lifetime. 
MKB Magnet Break Down
The diluter magnets MKB are housed in vacuum tanks 
and operate under vacuum. After a longer period of 
operation both systems have shown simultaneous magnet 
break-downs, as illustrated in Fig. 5 for one magnet. The 
failure for the Beam 2 system was explained by a non-
operational vacuum interlock, which allowed the system 
to pulse during several days under bad vacuum 
conditions, leading to damage due to glow discharge. 
However, 3 out of 4 magnets of the Beam 1 dilution 
system also showed a simultaneous break down, after 
many months of stable operation. This is worrying 
because it indicates the possibility of common mode 
failures which had not been anticipated [5]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The two LHC Beam Dumping Systems have been 
operational in the LHC tunnel for an average effective 
running period of almost two months. During this period 
four MKD extraction kicker switch failures occurred, 
which is close to the expected three failures. This 
confirms the assumed failure rate λ = 10-4 /h and is 
compatible with a SIL3 level of the system. However, this 
failure rate is not as low as stated by the switch 
manufacturer (λ = 2.4⋅10-6 /h). All failures which occurred 
during the reliability run were “safe” failures 
The reliability run allowed detecting some flaws on the 
system electronics, which will be upgraded accordingly. A 
temperature regulating system will be installed for the 
MKD generator switch compartment to guarantee 
sufficient pulse stability. 
A common mode failure of simultaneous break-downs 
of three out of the four installed MKB dilution system 
magnet occurred. This effect is not yet completely 
understood and is under further investigation. 
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Figure 5: Measured MKB current [kA] versus time during 
a break down. 
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